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Special Section:
Beliefs about Human Nature, Culture, and Science:
Survey and Symposium
This special section is designed to illuminate the degree to which the social sciences and humanities 
agree or disagree on two central issues: affirming the biological underpinnings of human behavior 
and affirming the epistemic validity of science. The survey article offers an analysis of more than 
600 responses to a survey questionnaire. For the symposium, the editors of ESIC invited a distin-
guished set of scholars and scientists to write short essays (about 1,500 words) reflecting on the 
issues in the questionnaire. Contributors to this symposium were chosen to represent a wide range 
of disciplines and diverse theoretical perspectives.
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A Cross-Disciplinary Survey of Beliefs about Human 
Nature, Culture, and Science
Joseph Carroll, John A. Johnson, Catherine Salmon, Jens Kjeldgaard-Christiansen, 
Mathias Clasen, and Emelie Jonsson
Abstract
How far has the Darwinian revolution come? To what extent have evolutionary ideas 
 penetrated into the social sciences and humanities? Are the “science wars” over? Or do 
whole blocs of disciplines face off over an unbridgeable epistemic gap? To answer  questions 
like these, contributors to top journals in 22 disciplines were surveyed on their beliefs 
about human nature, culture, and science. More than 600 respondents completed the 
survey. Scoring patterns divided into two main sets of disciplines. Genetic influences 
were emphasized in the evolutionary social sciences, evolutionary humanities, psychology, 
empirical study of the arts, philosophy, economics, and political science. Environmental 
influences were emphasized in most of the humanities disciplines and in anthropology, 
sociology, education, and women’s or gender studies. Confidence in scientific explanation 
correlated positively with emphasizing genetic influences on behavior, and negatively with 
emphasizing environmental influences. Knowing the current actual landscape of belief 
should help scholars avoid sterile debates and ease the way toward fruitful collaborations 
with neighboring disciplines.
Keywords:  human nature, culture, science, science wars, cultural construction, evolutionary social 
science, social science, humanities, biocultural theory 
INTRODUCTION
How much have evolutionary ideas penetrated 
into the various disciplines? To what extent, if 
any, do the social sciences and the humanities 
form separate, internally cohesive blocs—blocs 
defined by shared ideas about human nature and 
culture, and by shared attitudes toward science? 
To what extent do evolutionists in the social 
sciences and humanities converge in beliefs and 
attitudes? If the evolutionists stand together, to 
what extent do they stand apart from scholars 
and scientists publishing in journals that are not 
explicitly evolutionary? Do scholars and scien-
tists in different disciplines vary in the degree 
to which they share views with the evolution-
ists? For instance, are psychologists and political 
scientists closer in their views to evolutionists 
or to anthropologists and sociologists? Are 
anthropologists and sociologists closer to liter-
ary scholars and historians or to psychologists 
and political scientists? Do certain disciplines 
in the social sciences and humanities cluster 
together in emphasizing culture’s independence 
from biology, or in adopting skeptical attitudes 
toward the validity of scientific knowledge? Do 
other disciplines cluster together in empha-
sizing biological constraints on culture, or in 
affirming the validity of scientific knowledge? 
To what extent, if any, do beliefs about the 
validity of scientific knowledge correlate with a 
belief that human behavior is heavily influenced 
by biology?
Questions such as these characterize major 
controversies in academic intellectual life. Within 
the social sciences, for over a century, the  deepest 
ESIC  2017
Effective June 30, 2017, this article will be subject to a CC-BY-NC license. To view a copy of this license, 
visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/. Other than as provided by these licenses, no 
part of this article may be reproduced, transmitted, or displayed by any electronic or mechanical 
means without permission from the publisher or as permitted by law.
This content downloaded from 
            206.208.133.34 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 21:46:17 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Joseph Carroll et al.
2 Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture
conflict has been between contrasting claims for 
biological or environmental causes of behav-
ior. That conflict blazed up in the sociobiology 
wars of the 1970s, and has never since subsided 
(Fox 1989; Degler 1991; Tooby and Cosmides 
1992; Segerstråle 2000; Alcock 2001; Pinker 
2002; Kenrick 2011; Horowitz, Yaworsky, and 
Kickham 2014). Antagonism between the sci-
ences and humanities has been smoldering at 
least since the debate between T. H. Huxley and 
Matthew Arnold in the late Victorian period. 
In the middle of the twentieth century, it flared 
up in the “two cultures” debate between C. P. 
Snow and F. R. Leavis; and in the 1990s, it 
flashed into open warfare—“the science wars” 
(Huxley [1880] 1898; Arnold [1882] 1974; 
Snow [1959] 1993; Leavis [1959] 1972; Gross 
and Levitt 1994; Aronowitz 1996; Koertge 
1998; Sokal and Bricmont 1998; Brown 2001; 
Weinberg 2001; Parsons 2003; Boghossian 
2006; Smith 2006; Carroll 2011; Smith 2016). 
In recent decades, the conflict over scientific 
knowledge has been closely intertwined with the 
conflict over the causes of human  behavior—
closely intertwined, but not simply reducible 
one to the other. Even without support from 
hard data, one might be confident that theorists 
who deprecate biological influences on behav-
ior range from social scientists who adopt rig-
orous empirical methods to philosophers and 
historians of science who regard science as a 
medium for ideology. Is it nonetheless true that 
describing science as socially constructed cor-
relates with minimizing biological influences on 
human behavior? And if that correlation does 
exist, does it cross the boundary between the 
social sciences and the humanities? One might 
guess, and dispute. Instead, we gathered system-
atic survey data to help answer these questions.
To assess basic beliefs and attitudes about biol-
ogy, culture, and science, we developed a survey 
questionnaire that deployed four main groups of 
statements: (1) statements about human univer-
sals and cultural  diversity; (2) statements about 
the relative causal force of evolved and genet-
ically transmitted  characteristics, on the one 
side, and environmental causes, including cul-
tural conventions, on the other; (3) statements 
about the interactions between culture and 
evolution over evolutionary time scales—that 
is, statements about gene–culture coevolution, 
cultural autonomy, and cultural evolution; and 
(4) statements about the validity and scope of
scientific explanation. Respondents were asked
to indicate the degree to which they agreed or
disagreed with these statements.
The survey was designed to give an up- 
to-date map of the current academic landscape 
of belief. Any such map has intrinsic interest, 
and it can also contribute to research. It can 
enable intellectual historians to orient them-
selves more accurately toward current beliefs 
and attitudes. Knowing what researchers in 
other disciplines actually think can help sci-
entists and scholars formulate hypotheses that 
isolate real issues at contention and thus avoid 
sterile controversies generated by  unintentional 
straw-manning. Conversely, having data on 
actual beliefs can help forestall evasions or 
obfuscations produced by an inconsistent use 
of terms. On the more positive side, finding 
that contiguous disciplines are closer in belief 
than one supposed could ease the way toward 
cross-disciplinary collaboration and synthesis.
For many researchers, synthesis, integration, 
and comprehensiveness have inherent value 
(Wilson 1998; Slingerland and Collard 2012; 
Carroll, McAdams, and Wilson 2016). A chief 
motive in conducting this survey was to find out 
how far we have come in achieving a consensus 
based both on a shared reliance on scientific 
knowledge and on shared ideas about the bio-
logical underpinnings of human behavior—how 
far we have come, and how far we still have to go.
METHODS
Selecting and Categorizing Disciplines
Potential respondents were selected by 
 balancing two criteria for inclusion: (1) approx-
imating to the proportions of PhDs awarded 
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in the various disciplines of the social sciences 
and humanities; and (2) obtaining fairly equal 
numbers of respondents among evolution-
ary social scientists, nonevolutionary social 
scientists, and nonevolutionary humanists. 
(The much smaller target number of evolu-
tionary humanists was determined by the small 
number available. A search for journal articles 
by evolutionary humanists produced a list of 
79 potential respondents.) A table created by 
the National Center for Education Statistics 
provided information on numbers of PhDs 
awarded.1 Beginning with information provided 
by this table, a list of disciplines was compiled 
and target numbers of potential respondents 
assigned to each discipline.
In addition to evolutionary social scientists 
and evolutionary humanists, 20 specific disci-
plines were identified as relevant to the survey. 
Humanities disciplines that are not explicitly 
designated as evolutionary include drama and 
theater, ethnic studies, film studies, history, his-
tory and philosophy of science, literary study 
(Anglophone, European, and comparative), 
music, philosophy, religious studies, and the 
visual arts. Disciplines in the social sciences 
that are not explicitly designated as evolution-
ary include anthropology, communication/
media studies/journalism (hereafter “commu-
nication”), criminology, economics, education, 
empirical study of the arts, political science, 
psychology, sociology, and women’s or gender 
studies. 
Sixteen of the disciplines not designated as 
specifically evolutionary could be unproblem-
atically assigned to either the social sciences or 
humanities. Four of the disciplines occupy a 
more borderline area between social sciences 
and humanities: communication, empiri-
cal studies of the arts, ethnic studies, and 
women’s or gender studies. Decisions about 
1 See table 324.10, “Doctor’s degrees conferred by post-
secondary institutions, by field of study: Selected years, 
1970–71 through 2013–14,” https://nces.ed.gov/pro-
grams/digest/d15/tables/dt15_324.10.asp?current=yes.
where to place these disciplines depended on 
subject matter, methodology, and classifica-
tion of journals in indices of impact factors. 
Researchers in the empirical studies of the arts 
have a humanities subject matter, but their 
methods are quantitative, and most of them 
have appointments in departments of psy-
chology. That group was thus assigned to the 
social sciences. Women’s or gender studies and 
ethnic studies have primarily social subjects, 
not subjects in imaginative culture (the arts, 
religion, history, philosophy). The top jour-
nals in ethnic studies, though, are primarily 
discursive, not quantitative, in orientation, 
and the top journals in women’s or gender 
studies include much quantitative work, so 
ethnic studies was placed in the humanities, 
and women’s or gender studies in the social 
sciences. In indices of impact factors, the top 
journals in communication are sometimes 
grouped with the social sciences and some-
times with the humanities. Much of the work, 
though, is quantitative, and the field as a whole 
seems to have more affinity, in both method-
ology and subject matter, with sociology than 
with literary study, history, or philosophy.
Selecting Journals and Respondents in  
Each Discipline
After setting targets for the number of invi-
tations to be issued in each of the 22 disci-
plines, potential respondents were selected by 
identifying contributors to major journals in 
each discipline. (The evolutionary humanists 
were an exception. Since only one short-lived 
journal was dedicated to that field, evolution-
ary humanists were identified by scanning 
bibliographies of humanistic journal articles 
published by evolutionists.) Major journals 
were identified by collating lists in three main 
online sources: 
Journal Citation Reports (Thomson Reuters 
ISI Web of Knowledge) (available through a 
library license) 
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Google Scholar Metrics (https://scholar.google.
com/citations?view_op=top_venues&hl=en) 
SCImago Journal Rankings (Scopus database, 
Elsevier B.V., http://www.scimagojr.com/ 
journalrank.php) 
These three sources use somewhat different but 
overlapping measures for journal impact scores. 
SCImago Journal Rankings and Google Scholar 
Metrics provide information on both the social 
sciences and the humanities. Google Scholar 
Metrics divides up some disciplines (history, for 
example) into subdisciplines distributed into 
both the social sciences and humanities. Journal 
Citation Reports, though putatively limited to 
the sciences and social sciences, provides ranked 
journal listings for ethnic studies, history, history 
and philosophy of science, and women’s studies.
To avoid bias produced by selecting poten-
tial respondents too heavily from any one 
journal, the target number for any given disci-
pline was divided among multiple top-ranked 
journals, with a limit of 10 journals, if (as in 
most cases) 10 journals could be identified 
as top-ranked. To give an example, a target 
was set for 200 invitations from anthropol-
ogy journals. Ten top journals were identified 
by collating lists from the three online data-
bases. Eleven journals appeared in the top 
lists for all three databases. The 10 highest 
ranking from those 11 were selected: Current 
Anthropology, American Journal of Physical 
Anthropology, Annual Review of Anthropology, 
American Journal of Human Biology, American 
Ethnologist, Cultural Anthropology, Journal of 
the Royal Anthropological Institute, American 
Anthropologist, Anthropological Quarterly, and 
Anthropological Theory. Twenty letters of invi-
tation were assigned to each of these 10 jour-
nals. Contributors to each of the journals were 
selected from among the most recent issues. 
Similar procedures were followed for each of 
the 20 disciplinary groups other than the evo-
lutionary humanists and evolutionary social 
scientists. 
One thousand evolutionary social scien-
tists were selected from among contributors 
to eight journals that are explicitly evolution-
ary in orientation: Cliodynamics, Evolution and 
Human Behavior, Human Nature, Evolutionary 
Behavioral Sciences (previously, 2007–2013, 
the Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural 
Psychology), Evolutionary Psychological Science, 
Evolutionary Anthropology, Evolutionary Psycho­
logy, Evolution, Mind, and Behavior (volumes 
1–5 published as the Journal of Cultural and 
Evolutionary Psychology; volumes 6–12 pub-
lished as the Journal of Evolutionary Psychology). 
Only one journal oriented to evolutionary stud-
ies in the humanities provided potential respon-
dents, the Evolutionary Review (four issues, 
2010–13). Other journals that provided poten-
tial respondents in the group of evolutionary 
humanists included Helios, Interdisciplinary 
Literary Studies, Mosaic, Ometeca, Philosophy 
and Literature, Politics & Culture, Studies in the 
Novel, Style, and Utopian Studies. None of the 
journals for the evolutionary social scientists or 
the evolutionary humanists was placed on any 
of the other disciplinary lists.
Each of the 4,071 potential respondents 
was sent an e-mail invitation giving a link to 
the questionnaire and identifying the jour-
nal from which his or her name had been 
drawn. In the questionnaire, each respon-
dent was asked to click on that journal from 
a drop-down list. By isolating journals within 
each discipline, and identifying the journal 
to which each respondent had contributed, 
 questionnaire scores could be segregated into 
specific disciplines.
We anticipated that some journals that are 
not explicitly designated as evolutionary would 
contain articles that are evolutionary in orien-
tation. General interest journals in psychology 
or anthropology, for instance, often publish 
articles by social scientists who also publish in 
the eight journals designated as explicitly evo-
lutionary. One main purpose of the study was 
to assess the degree to which the beliefs of con-
tributors to top journals in any given discipline 
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would converge or diverge from the beliefs 
of contributors to journals that are explicitly 
committed to an evolutionary analysis of 
human behavior. 
Two journals in anthropology presented a 
question as to whether they should be included 
in the evolutionary or nonevolutionary group: 
American Journal of Physical Anthropology 
and American Journal of Human Biology. 
We reflected that virtually no scientist contrib-
uting to an anthropology journal would deny, 
as physical facts, that humans have evolved or 
that humans are biological organisms. We dis-
tinguished those noncontroversial affirmations 
from the presumably more controversial affir-
mation that biological adaptations influence 
human behavior. The eight journals that served 
as a source for evolutionary social scientists are 
characterized by an explicit affirmation of that 
presumably controversial proposition. Since 
neither physical anthropology nor the study 
of human biology requires an affirmation of 
the controversial proposition that character-
izes the set of eight evolutionary journals, the 
American Journal of Physical Anthropology and 
the American Journal of Human Biology were 
included in the group of journals that are not 
explicitly evolutionary in orientation. A post 
hoc comparison of scores among these two 
journals, the other anthropology journals, and 
the evolutionary journals confirmed the validity 
of the reasoning on which the segregation had 
been made.
Measures
The questionnaire was made available to partic-
ipants via Survey Monkey. It consisted of several 
demographic questions, including disciplinary 
affiliation and the journal from which the partic-
ipant was recruited. The rest of the questionnaire 
involved rating agreement/disagreement with a 
number of statements on a series of seven-point 
Likert scales. The statements were clustered by 
general theme (human universals and cultural 
diversity; what shapes gender; what shapes 
human behavior; what shapes values, beliefs, 
and feelings; what shapes culture; whether 
science can explain human behavior), and each 
cluster of three or four statements was followed 
by an option to comment on the statements 
(limited to 500 words per comment). 
Controversies about behavioral varia-
tion in human populations include not only 
hypotheses about interactions between human 
 universals and cultural conventions but also 
hypotheses about racial and ethnic differences 
(Tooby and Cosmides 1990, 1992; Rushton 
2000; Sarich and Miele 2004; Gould [1981] 
2008; Culotta 2012; Wade 2014). Accordingly, 
a question was included that asked for agree-
ment/disagreement on the existence of ethnic/
racial differences in cognition and behavioral 
dispositions. If participants professed any level 
of agreement on the existence of such differ-
ences, they received additional questions about 
the possible genetic and environmental causes 
of the differences. 
Response Rates
Given that the letters of invitation identified 
the source of the invitation as a journal titled 
Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture, the 
authors anticipated a higher rate of response 
from evolutionists than from nonevolutionists. 
Indeed, from 1,000 letters sent to evolution-
ary social scientists, 208 (21%) resulted in a 
response, while only 199 (11.1%) of the 1,800 
nonevolutionary social scientists contacted 
responded; 29 (41%) of the 71 evolutionary 
humanists responded, while 179 (14.9%) of the 
nonevolutionary humanists responded.
Planned Analyses
Several sets of statistical analyses were planned 
to examine how academics from different dis-
ciplines differed in their beliefs about human 
nature, culture, and science. First, descriptive 
statistics were computed to assess the number of 
valid cases for each survey item and to examine 
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the frequencies for each response category for 
the survey items.
The responses to the survey were then sub-
jected to a principal components analysis to see if 
the data could be reduced to several general fac-
tors. Subsequently, items that loaded  primarily 
on one of the general factors were combined to 
form reliable scales. Mean scores on these scales 
were compared across the 22 disciplines. Effect 
sizes between pairs of disciplines were calculated 
for 12 disciplines that had relatively large num-
bers of respondents and that, in addition to the 
2 evolutionary groups, gave a representative sam-
pling from among the nonevolutionary social 
sciences and the nonevolutionary humanities.
Next, disciplines were classified according 
to whether they represented one of the social 
sciences or one of the humanities and whether 
they held an evolutionary or nonevolution-
ary perspective. Means on the survey factors 
were compared for the four resulting catego-
ries (evolutionary social sciences, evolutionary 
humanities, nonevolutionary social sciences, 
nonevolutionary humanities) with a 2x2 anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA).
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The number of respondents, means, and stan-
dard deviations for each survey item are shown 
in table 1. Of the 634 respondents, valid 
responses were received from 614 to 633 (min./
max.) of the participants to most of the survey 
items. The three items on causes of cognitive 
and behavioral differences among ethnic and 
racial groups were answered by only 162 to 164 
participants because these items were adminis-
tered only to participants who agreed with a pre-
vious item stating that such differences existed.
Means ranged from a low of 2.33, for 
“Cultures vary so widely that one cannot iden-
tify any important underlying commonalities of 
values, beliefs, and feelings among all cultures,” 
to a high of 6.28, for “Human behavior is 
produced by an interaction between genetically 
transmitted characteristics and environmental 
conditions, including cultural conventions.” 
Distributions of responses were skewed for 
about half of the items, but even items where 
participants leaned toward the high or low end 
showed sufficient endorsement frequencies 
across the seven response categories to subject 
the responses to principal components analyses. 
Results of Principal Component Analysis
An exploratory principal components factor 
analysis initially identified six factors with eigen-
values greater than 1. However, the sixth factor 
was defined by only one item, so the analysis 
was repeated, specifying a five-factor solution. 
Items assessing a common theme tended to load 
highly on the same factor except for the four 
items dealing with cognitive and behavioral dif-
ferences among ethnic/racial groups. Because of 
the low response rate for three of these items 
and unclear loadings from all of them, they were 
excluded from the final principal components 
analysis, which produced a clearly interpretable 
four-factor solution accounting for 60% of the 
total variance.
The first factor, accounting for 31.5% of 
the total variance, was defined primarily by six 
items stating that the environment produces 
human behavior, values, beliefs, feelings, and 
gender identities and that culture operates inde-
pendently of genetics. We labeled this factor 
Environmental Determinism.
The second factor, accounting for 12.6% of 
the total variance, was defined by the four items 
stating that science can explain nature, human 
behavior, imaginative artifacts, and subjec-
tive human experience. We labeled this factor 
Scientific Explanation.
The third factor, accounting for 9% of the 
total variance, was defined by six items stating 
that genes produce human nature, behavior, 
values, beliefs, feelings, gender identities, cul-
ture, and the human life cycle. We labeled this 
factor Genetic Determinism.
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TABLE 1 Responses to Survey Items.
Variable N Mean Std Dev
Humans have a nature, a species-typical set of characteristics that are 
genetically transmitted, that have evolved in an adaptive relationship to the 
environment, and that form an underlying unity for all diversity in culture and 
individual behavior.
633 5.57 1.57
Cultures vary so widely that one cannot identify any important underlying 
commonalities of values, beliefs, and feelings among all cultures.
633 2.33 1.55
The human life cycle (birth, growth, reproductive maturity, old age, death) is regulated 
by a species-wide set of genetically transmitted adaptations shaped by natural 
selection.
631 5.36 1.63
Gender identities in humans are produced predominantly or exclusively by biological 
characteristics, that is, by genetically encoded behavioral dispositions mediated by 
anatomy, hormones, and physiology.
624 3.58 1.83
Gender identities in humans are produced predominantly or exclusively by 
environmental conditions, including cultural conventions.
623 3.21 1.71
Gender identities in humans are produced by an interaction between genes and 
environmental conditions, including cultural conventions.
629 5.96 1.36
Human behavior is produced predominantly or exclusively by genetically transmitted 
characteristics.
624 2.58 1.55
Human behavior is produced predominantly or exclusively by environmental 
conditions, including cultural conventions.
624 3.21 1.74
Human behavior is produced by an interaction between genetically transmitted 
characteristics and environmental conditions, including cultural conventions.
629 6.28 1.09
Culture is produced by genetically transmitted human behavioral dispositions 
interacting with environmental conditions.
625 4.25 2.05
Culture is not constrained by genetically transmitted human behavioral dispositions. 622 2.98 1.95
During human evolution, genes and culture have had cumulative causal effects on 
each other, with genetic changes leading to cultural developments, and with cultural 
developments leading to genetic changes.
620 5.58 1.52
Culture evolves independently of human biological evolution. 619 2.92 1.89
Human values, beliefs, and feelings are derived exclusively or predominantly from 
cultural conventions.
620 3.41 1.85
Human values, beliefs, and feelings are derived exclusive or predominantly from 
genetically transmitted characteristics.
621 2.46 1.37
Human values, beliefs, and feelings are produced by an interaction between adaptations 
shaped by selection and environmental conditions, including cultural conventions.
627 5.89 1.39
There are significant differences among ethnic and/or racial groups— differences 
that include behavioral dispositions and/or cognitive capacities.
614 2.95 1.95
Significant cognitive and/or behavioral differences among ethnic and/or racial groups 
are attributable exclusively to environmental conditions, including cultural conventions.
163 3.82 2.00
Significant cognitive and behavioral differences among ethnic and/or racial groups 
are attributable exclusively to heritable characteristics.
164 2.57 1.58
(Continued )
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The fourth factor, accounting for 6.9% of 
the total variance, was defined by four items 
dealing with the interactive effects of genes 
and environments on each other and on 
human behavior, values, beliefs, feelings, and 
gender identities. We labeled this factor Gene–
Environment Interactionism.
Scales were created by summing the 
items whose high loadings defined each 
factor, and Cronbach alpha reliability esti-
mates were  calculated. These reliability 
coefficients were as follows: Environmental 
Determinism, .79; Genetic Determinism, .79; 
Gene–Environment Interactionism, .75; and 
Scientific Explanation, .88.
Although the varimax orthogonal rotation 
forced the four principal component factors to 
correlate zero with each other, each of the four 
scales was constructed from only a subset of 
the highest-loading items and therefore could 
correlate with each other. Table 2 presents the 
intercorrelation matrix for the four scales. This 
table shows that Genetic Deter minism, Gene–
Environment Interactionism, and Scientific 
Explanation all intercorrelated positively, indi-
cating that persons endorsing one of these 
beliefs tend to endorse the others. In contrast, 
Environmental Determinism correlated nega-
tively with all three for these scales, indicating 
that persons who believe in environmental deter-
minism tend to reject the other three beliefs.
Comparison of Individual Disciplines
The next set of results covers comparisons 
between individual disciplines on the four 
 factor-scale scores. First, some representative 
disciplines illustrate patterns of scores on the 
four factors. Then, for each of the four factors, 
a graph (figure 1) shows the ranking of all dis-
ciplines, followed by a table comparing scores 
between disciplines by listing of all Cohen’s 
d effect sizes that are .20 or greater. For each 
of the four factors, there are 12 disciplines in 
the graph that also appear in the table of effect 
sizes. These disciplines are represented by black 
bars in the graph. The other 10 disciplines in 
the graph are represented by light gray bars.
TABLE 1 Responses to Survey Items–Continued
Variable N Mean Std Dev
Significant cognitive and behavioral differences among ethnic and/or racial groups 
are attributable to an interaction between heritable characteristics and environmental 
conditions, including cultural conventions. 
162 5.42 1.69
Nature forms a unified structure that can be objectively known by science. 616 4.7 1.97
Human behavior can be objectively explained by science. 618 4.62 1.98
Subjective human experience can be explained scientifically. 618 4.53 1.83
Imaginative artifacts like music, painting, and literature can be objectively understood 
using scientific knowledge.
618 4.31 2.00
TABLE 2 Correlations among the Four Factors.
Environmental 
Determinism
Genetic 
Determinism
Gene–Environment 
Interactionism
Environmental Determinism
Genetic Determinism –.37
Gene–Environment Interactionism –.43 .35
Scientific Explanation –.40 .54 .28
Note: Ns range from 617 to 634. All correlations are significant at the  p < .001 level (two-tailed).
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Disciplines representing environmental empha­
sis, genetic emphasis, and intermediates. Figure 1 
shows factor-scale scores for six disciplines that 
represent a range of scores on the four factors. 
Note the similar “stair-step” pattern between 
Genetic Determinism and Gene–Environment 
Interactionism, with the six disciplines showing 
nearly identical rankings. Scientific Explanation 
shows a less clear but comparable pattern. 
The clear pattern in Genetic Determinism and 
Gene–Environment Interactionism is reversed 
for Environmental Determinism.
Environmental Determinism effect sizes. 
Figure 2 presents a ranking of disciplines on 
the Environmental Determinism factor from 
low to high. (The number of respondents in 
each discipline is noted parenthetically after 
the name of the discipline.) Note that the two 
explicitly evolutionary groups rank lowest on 
this factor. Disciplines from the social sciences 
and humanities can be found along all points 
of the continuum, with drama, sociology, and 
visual arts showing the highest scores.
Table 3 compares Environmental Deter-
minism scores between disciplines. Note 
the shading and font code that distinguishes 
the smallest Cohen’s d effect size considered 
(at least .20 but less than .45; for example, the 
difference between evolutionary social science 
and psychology) up to the largest observed 
effect sizes (1.5 standard deviations or greater).
Genetic Determinism effect sizes. Figure 3 
presents a ranking of disciplines on the Genetic 
Determinism factor from low to high. This 
ranking is largely a reversal of the ranking on 
Environmental Determinism (Spearman’s rho 
= –.64) with the two evolutionary groups this 
time at the very top.
Table 4 presents a comparison of disciplines 
on Genetic Determinism, listing the Cohen’s 
d effect sizes greater than .20. The highest 
scorer, evolutionary humanities, distinguished 
itself from the crowd, showing effect sizes 
greater than 1.50 with five other disciplines and 
effect sizes between 1.00 and 1.50 with four 
disciplines. The evolutionary humanities were 
even half a standard deviation above the evolu-
tionary social sciences on this factor.
Gene–Environment Interactionism effect sizes. 
Figure 4 ranks disciplines from high to low on 
the Gene-Environment Interactionism factor. 
This ranking was similar to the ranking for 
Genetic Determinism (Spearman’s rho = .67); 
as was the case with that factor, evolutionary 
FIGURE 1 Examples of Environmental Emphasis, Genetic Emphasis, and Intermediates.
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FIGURE 2 Environmental Determinism Factor Scores.
TABLE 3 Environmental Determinism Effect Sizes.
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TABLE 4 Genetic Determinism Effect Sizes.
humanities and evolutionary social sciences 
lead all disciplines, with ethnic studies at the 
very bottom. However, in contrast to the first 
two factors, which showed a great disparity 
across disciplines, all disciplines were on average 
in agreement with the proposition that human 
behavior is a function of gene– environment 
interaction. The lowest-scoring discipline, 
ethnic studies, had a score of 4.53, which is in 
the range of agreement.
Table 5 compares the disciplines that differ 
on Gene–Environment Interactionism by a 
FIGURE 3 Genetic Determinism Factor Scores.
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TABLE 5 Gene–Environment Interactionism Effect Sizes.
FIGURE 4 Gene–Environment Interactionism Factor Scores.
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Cohen’s d of at least .20. Effect sizes were not 
as great for this factor as for the previous two 
factors, confirming greater agreement across 
many disciplines that gene–environment inter-
actions are responsible for human behavior. 
There were no Cohen’s d scores above 1.10. The 
 highest-scoring disciplines, evolutionary human-
ities and evolutionary social sciences, showed 
the most divergence from other disciplines, with 
the latter exhibiting somewhat higher d scores 
because of the larger sample size for this group.
Scientific Explanation effect sizes. Figure 5 
presents the ranking of disciplines on Scientific 
Explanation. Unsurprisingly, the social sciences 
tended to score higher than the humanities, with 
economics, political science, and evolutionary 
TABLE 6 Scientific Explanation Effect Sizes.
FIGURE 5 Scientific Explanation Factor Scores.
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social science displaying the highest scores, while 
drama, literary study, and music displayed the 
lowest scores.
Table 6 presents differences in Scien tific 
Ex planation across disciplines, listing all differ-
ences represented by a Cohen’s d of at least .20. 
Although a number of significant differences 
between disciplines can be found, the largest ds 
are found with literary study, which scores at least 
1.5 standard deviations lower than six other disci-
plines, including over 2 standard deviations lower 
than evolutionary social science. Evolutionary 
social science, which scored higher than any other 
discipline, also showed very large differences with 
education, history and philosophy of science, his-
tory, sociology, and anthropology.
Results of 2x2 Analyses of  Variance
Disciplines were classified as belonging to 
either the social sciences or humanities and 
as being either evolutionary or nonevolu-
tionary. The disciplines’ classifications into 
the resulting four categories were as follows. 
Evolutionary Social Sciences included one dis-
cipline: evolutionary social science (N = 208). 
Nonevolutionary Social Sciences included 10 
disciplines: anthropology, communication, 
criminology, economics, education, empirical 
study of the arts, political science, psychol-
ogy, sociology, and women’s/gender studies 
(N = 199). Evolutionary Humanities included 
one discipline, evolutionary humanities (N = 28). 
And Nonevolutionary Humanities included 10 
disciplines: drama, ethnic studies, film studies, 
history, history and philosophy of science, liter-
ary study, music, philosophy, religious studies, 
and visual arts (N = 178).
Means and standard deviations for the 
four groups on Environmental Determinism, 
Genetic Determinism, Gene–Environment 
Interactionism, and Scientific Explanation are 
shown in table 7. 
The 2x2 ANOVAs showed the following 
significant effects. 
First, Nonevolutionists scored higher than 
Evolutionists on Environmental Determinism, 
F(1,609) = 79.20, p < .001.
For Genetic Determinism, there was a sig-
nificant statistical interaction, F(1,610) = 6.20, 
p < .05, between the Evolutionary/Nonevolu-
tionary factor and the Social Sciences/Humanities 
factor. There were significant simple effects for the 
Evolutionary/Nonevolutionary factor, with evolu-
tionary social scientists scoring higher than non-
evolutionary social scientists, F(1,610) = 54.97, 
p < .001, and evolutionary humanists scoring 
higher than nonevolutionary humanists, F(1,610) 
= 40.80, p < .001, but the mean difference between 
the evolutionists and nonevolutionists was greater 
for the humanists. Another way to look at the sta-
tistical interaction is that there was no significant 
TABLE 7 Factor Scores for Evolutionists, Nonevolutionists, Social Scientists, and Humanists.
Evolutionary Nonevolutionary
Mean SD N Mean SD N
Environmental 
Determinism
Humanities 2.10 .83 28 3.50 1.20 178
Social Sciences 2.40 1.05 208 3.31 1.24 199
Genetic
Determinism
Humanities 5.06 .98 28 3.63 1.07 178
Social Sciences 4.47 1.15 208 3.66 1.09 199
Gene–Environment 
Interactionism
Humanities 6.33 .81 28 5.63 1.17 178
Social Sciences 6.32 .77 208 5.73 .97 199
Scientific Explanation Humanities 5.05 1.45 27 3.44 1.57 174
Social Sciences 5.54 1.15 204 4.40 1.60 195
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difference between the nonevolutionary social sci-
entists and nonevolutionary humanists, F(1,610) 
= .09, n.s., while the evolutionary humanists 
scored even higher than the evolutionary social 
scientists, F(1,610) = 7.00, p < .01.
The 2 × 2 ANOVA for Gene–Environment 
Interactionism showed only a significant main 
effect of the Evolutionary/Nonevolutionary 
factor, F(1,610) = 34.63, p < .001, with the evo-
lutionists endorsing gene–environment interac-
tionism more strongly than nonevolutionists.
There were two main effects on Scientific 
Explanation scores. The evolutionists scored 
higher on this scale than nonevolutionists, 
F(1,596) = 68.25, p < .001. And the social 
scientists scored higher than the humanists, 
F(1,596) = 19.22, p < .05.
Views on the Existence of Racial/Ethnic 
Differences
The participants’ responses to the four items 
assessing their views on racial/ethnic differ-
ences unexpectedly did not align coherently 
with their responses to the other items, so 
responses to these items were examined sepa-
rately. More participants (N = 614) responded 
to the item on the existence of racial/ethnic 
differences than to the other three items (Ns = 
162–164), so this item was analyzed first. We 
split the sample at the scale midpoint, 4, form-
ing two groups: those who disagreed that racial/
ethnic differences exist and those who agreed 
that such differences exist. A cross-tabulation 
of those groups with the two other groupings 
(evolutionary/nonevolutionary; social sciences/
humanities) produced the distribution of par-
ticipants shown in table 8.
A chi-square (Fisher’s Exact Test) indicated 
that the overall proportions in table 8 differed 
from what would be expected by chance, p < .05. 
Looking at the cells individually, the number of 
Evolutionary Social Scientists and Evolutionary 
Humanists who agreed that racial differences exist 
was exactly what would be expected by chance. 
This means that membership in these two cate-
gories had no impact on agreeing or disagreeing 
with the existence of racial differences. However, 
the Nonevolutionary Social Scientists agreed 
that racial differences exist at a greater level than 
expected by chance, while the Nonevolutionary 
Humanists disagreed that racial differences exist 
at a greater level than expected by chance. To be 
clear, all four groups denied racial differences 
more often than they affirmed them. But the 
Nonevolutionary Social Scientists affirmed racial 
differences more often than expected while the 
Nonevolutionary Humanists denied them more 
often than expected by chance.
Although there were only 162–164 valid cases 
for the three items on causes of ethnic/racial dif-
ferences, tentative analyses were undertaken to 
see if data from those items might be used. The 
item attributing ethnic/racial differences to the 
environment correlated zero with the item attrib-
uting these differences to heritable factors and 
TABLE 8 Scores on Racial and/or Ethnic Differences.
Racial and/or ethnic differences
Totalsdo exist do not exist
observed expected observed expected
Evolutionary Social Sciences 58 57.5 97 97.5 155
Evolutionary Humanities 8 8.5 15 14.5 23
Nonevolutionary Social Science 52 44.7 116 123.3 168
Nonevolutionary Humanities 34 41.3 121 113.7 155
Totals 152 349 501
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r = -.39 with the item attributing these differ-
ences to gene–environment interactions. The 
heritability item and gene–environment interac-
tion item correlated r = .24. Combining the items 
into a scale with the environmental item reversed 
produced a scale with a Cronbach alpha of only 
.45, well below the accepted minimum of .70. A 
2x2 ANOVA on the scale showed no significant 
effects of academic affiliation on perceived cause 
of racial and/or ethnic differences. Separate 2x2 
ANOVAs on the individual items also showed 
no significant effects. In short, no meaningful 
conclusions could be drawn about  academics’ 
views of the causes of racial and/or ethnic 
differences.
The Four Factors: Cross-Disciplinary Clustering
Do the nonevolutionary social sciences 
and the nonevolutionary humanities form 
 separate, internally cohesive blocs that can be 
defined by shared ideas about human nature 
and culture, and by shared attitudes toward 
science? On the three factors that isolate 
causal beliefs—Environmental Determinism, 
Genetic Determinism, and Gene–Environment 
Interactionism—they most definitely do not, 
but the humanities come much closer to form-
ing a cohesive group than the social sciences 
do. One main segment of the social sciences—
anthropology, sociology, education, and wom-
en’s or gender studies—clusters with the core 
humanities disciplines: literary study, history, 
history and philosophy of science, ethnic stud-
ies, and visual arts. Another main segment of the 
social sciences—psychology, empirical study of 
the arts, economics, and political science—has 
scores closer to those of the evolutionists than 
to those of the group constituted by most of 
the humanities and by social sciences such as 
anthropology and sociology. Communication 
and criminology do not contribute much 
to polarization between the nonevolution-
ary social sciences and humanities. They have 
small Ns and also display mid-range scores. 
On the third causal factor, Gene–Environment 
Interactionism, the variation among disciplines 
is much smaller than on the other two causal 
factors but the distribution of disciplines is sim-
ilar. 
The two evolutionary groups occupy the 
lowest-scoring positions on Environmental 
Determinism and the highest-scoring posi-
tions on Genetic Determinism and Gene–
Environment Interactionism; they are both in 
the top half of the distribution on Scientific 
Explanation. Psychology and empirical study of 
the arts score in the bottom half of the distri-
bution on Environmental Determinism and in 
the top half on Genetic Determinism, Gene–
Environment Interactionism, and Scientific 
Explanation. In that respect, they remain in 
close association with the two evolutionary dis-
ciplines and also with philosophy and political 
science. 
Economics and political science form a small 
subgroup to themselves. They are adjacent in 
scoring sequence on all four factors: moder-
ately low on Environmental Determinism and 
quite high on both Genetic Determinism and 
Scientific Explanation; on Gene–Environment 
Interactionism, they split the middle (positions 
11 and 12 in the sequence of 22).
In contrast to scores on the three causal 
 factors, on Scientific Explanation there is a 
greater pull toward polarization between the 
social sciences and humanities, with the social 
sciences tending toward scientific affirmation 
and the humanities toward skepticism. But even 
on this factor, one humanities discipline (philos-
ophy) scores in the top half of the distribution, 
and two social science disciplines (anthropology 
and women’s or gender studies) score in the 
bottom half. Anthropology scores lower than the 
history and philosophy of science, and women’s 
or gender studies scores lower than both anthro-
pology and history. Sociology, though in the top 
half of the distribution, scores lower than eight 
other disciplines, including both the evolution-
ary humanities and philosophy.
If we separate the 22 disciplines into just 
4 components—evolutionary, nonevolutionary, 
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social science, and humanities—the 2´2 
ANOVAs reveal that on the three causal factors 
the only statistically significant difference is that 
between evolutionists and nonevolutionists. On 
the fourth factor, Scientific Explanation, the 
evolutionists score significantly higher than the 
nonevolutionists, and the social scientists also 
score higher than the humanists. However, the 
broad patterns revealed in the 2´2 ANOVAs 
contain substantial variation both within each 
of the two nonevolutionary groups and between 
the two evolutionary groups. The largest varia-
tion appears in the nonevolutionary social sci-
ences. On all four factors, the graphs displaying 
scores for individual disciplines do not form 
sharply demarcated blocs but rather fairly con-
tinuous slopes from high to low on each factor. 
In all four of those slopes, some social science 
disciplines rank near the top, and others near 
the bottom. 
The evolutionists score in the terminal 
positions of the sequence on all three causal 
factors, but the differences between the evolu-
tionists and the highest-scoring nonevolution-
ary disciplines are smaller than the differences 
among the highest-scoring nonevolutionary 
disciplines and the lowest-scoring nonevolu-
tionary disciplines. For example, the differ-
ences between scores for the evolutionary social 
sciences and for psychology are consistently 
smaller than the differences between scores for 
psychology and for anthropology, sociology, 
education, and women’s or gender studies. On 
Environmental Determinism, for example, 
the Cohen’s d (effect size) for the difference 
in scores between the evolutionary social sci-
ences and psychology is .26, a small difference. 
In contrast, the Cohen’s d for psychology and 
sociology is 1.22, for psychology and literary 
study 1.00, for psychology and anthropology 
.96, and for psychology and women’s or gender 
studies .75—all large effect sizes. 
The two evolutionary groups are adjacent 
at far ends of the scales on Environmental 
Determinism, Genetic Determinism, and Gene– 
Environment Interactionism. They thus form a 
distinct pair, but not a pair radically disjunc-
tive from the nonevolutionary disciplines. 
On Environmental Determinism, the dis-
tance (.3) between the mean of the evolu-
tionary humanities (2.1) and the mean of the 
evolutionary social sciences (2.4) is greater 
than the distance between the mean of the 
evolutionary social sciences and that of film 
studies (2.54), philosophy (2.6), and psy-
chology (2.66). On Genetic Determinism, 
the distance (.59) between the mean of the 
evolutionary humanities (5.06) and the evolu-
tionary social sciences (4.47) is greater than the 
distance between the means of the evolutionary 
social sciences and economics, political science, 
film studies, psychology, religious studies, phi-
losophy, empirical studies of the arts, commu-
nication, and visual arts. On this factor, the 
evolutionary humanities could be said to form 
a group of one, standing apart from the next 
10 disciplines in the sequence. Even so, the 
distance (.59) between the mean of the evolu-
tionary humanities and that of the evolutionary 
social sciences is dwarfed by the distance (1.43) 
between the mean of the evolutionary social sci-
ences (4.47) and that of anthropology (3.04). 
On Gene–Environment Interactionism, 
the means for the two evolutionary groups are 
only .01 apart, but the distance between that 
mean and the next three disciplines (commu-
nication, psychology, and film studies) is less 
than a tenth of a point. When the evolution-
ists are set off against all the nonevolutionary 
disciplines, in an ANOVA, they score signifi-
cantly higher. If the 5 highest-scoring disci-
plines were grouped together, however, and 
set off against the remaining 17, that group 
of 5 would score significantly higher than the 
group of 17. The point here is that on the three 
causal factors, there is in fact no sharp break 
between the two evolutionary disciplines and 
other disciplines. A more important difference 
is the very sharp contrast between the high and 
low ends of the scales on Environmental and 
Genetic Determinism; on Gene–Environment 
Interactionism, the contrasts are much less 
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sharp but still distinct—distinct enough so that 
the two evolutionary disciplines alone, despite 
their close proximity to other disciplines, score 
significantly higher than all nonevolutionary 
disciplines clustered together.
On the ANOVA for Scientific Explanation, 
there was a significant main effect for the 
Evolutionary-Nonevolutionary factor. This 
means that the two evolutionary disciplines 
together score on average significantly higher 
than the weighted average of all the nonevolu-
tionary disciplines combined. However, there 
was also a significant main effect for the Social 
Sciences-Humanities factor. The evolutionary 
humanities actually score lower on Scientific 
Explanation than political science, economics, 
and the empirical studies of the arts. The evolu-
tionists score significantly higher than all non-
evolutionary disciplines combined because the 
evolutionary social sciences score highest and 
because disciplines at the low end of the scale 
score very low. The Cohen’s d for the evolution-
ary social sciences and literary study (2.27) is 
the largest in the study, and it is accompanied 
by other large effect sizes for the evolutionary 
social sciences and history (1.47), history and 
philosophy of science (1.45), anthropology 
(1.41), education (1.18), and sociology (1.08). 
On Scientific Explanation, the distance 
between the mean of the evolutionary social 
sciences (5.54) and that of the next highest 
scorer (political science, 5.27) is not very great. 
Accordingly, the Cohen’s d for political science 
and literary study (1.93) is the second largest 
effect size in the survey. Literary study scores so 
low on this factor that it has large Cohen’s d effect 
sizes with disciplines that it clusters with on the 
Environmental and Genetic Determinism fac-
tors, such as sociology (Cohen’s d 1.04) and edu-
cation (Cohen’s d .93). But literary study is not 
isolated and anomalous. It scores higher (mean 
= 2.92) than drama (mean = 2.58) and only a 
little lower than music (mean = 2.96) and ethnic 
studies (mean = 3.09). The distance between the 
mean of literary study (2.92) and the mean of 
anthropology (3.76) is .84. That is less than half 
the distance between the means of anthropol-
ogy and evolutionary social science (distance = 
1.78). The effect size for the difference between 
anthropology and literary study is .59, a little 
more than half a standard deviation. In con-
trast, the effect size for the difference between 
anthropology and the evolutionary social 
sciences (Cohen’s d = 1.41) is nearly one and a 
half standard deviations.
Do scholars and scientists who affirm that 
human behavior is heavily influenced by biology 
also tend to affirm the validity of scientific expla-
nation? Yes, they do. The ANOVA results tell us 
that much by isolating the two evolutionary dis-
ciplines and noting that they score significantly 
higher than the other 20 disciplines taken as a 
group. But evolutionary ideas have penetrated 
into other disciplines also—disciplines such as 
psychology, philosophy, and political science. 
Comparing factor scores among all the respon-
dents, Scientific Explanation correlates nega-
tively with Environmental Determinism (r = -.40, 
p < .001), positively with Genetic Determinism 
(r =.54, p < .001), and positively also with Gene–
Environment Interactionism (r = .28, p < .001). 
To sum up, the two evolutionary  disciplines 
pair up fairly closely on all four factors, but 
on three factors—Environmental Deter-
minism, Genetic Determinism, and Scientific 
Explanation—the differences in mean score 
between the two are greater than the differences 
between one of the two evolutionary disciplines 
and one or more of the nonevolutionary dis-
ciplines. Polarization in beliefs and attitudes 
is a reality, but it is neither a complete polar-
ization between the evolutionary and nonev-
olutionary disciplines nor between the social 
sciences and humanities. It is a polarization, 
on the causal factors, between Environmental 
and Genetic Determinism; and on Scientific 
Explanation, between science affirmers and 
science skeptics. Humanities and social sci-
ence disciplines are strung out all along the 
slopes between the terminal points on these 
two scales. ANOVA results inform us that in 
the nonevolutionary humanities, the center 
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of gravity is located toward the bottom of 
the scale for Genetic Determinism and also 
for Scientific Explanation. In the nonevolu-
tionary social sciences, the center of gravity 
is located somewhat closer to the top of the 
scale for Scientific Explanation. On the three 
causal factors, the nonevolutionary social sci-
ences are distributed along the whole scale—
with representatives at both ends and in the 
middle. 
Two Polarized Groups: Genetic Emphasis and 
Environmental Emphasis
To isolate main tendencies in the scoring pat-
tern, the 22 disciplines can be divided into 
two groups, one group emphasizing environ-
mental causes, and the other genetic causes 
(see figure 6). 
This division was achieved by apportioning 
scores on the three causal factors into top and 
bottom halves. Eight disciplines score in the 
top half of the distribution on Environmental 
Determinism and in the bottom half on 
Genetic Determinism. (Six of the eight also 
score in the top half on Gene–Environment 
Interactionism). Another eight disciplines 
score in the bottom half of the distribution on 
Environmental Determinism and the top half 
on Genetic Determinism. (Seven of those eight 
also score in the top half on Gene–Environment 
Interactionism). The remaining six disciplines 
(ethnic studies, music, religious studies, visual 
arts, criminology, and communication) can 
be distributed between the two groups on the 
basis of scoring in the environmental or genetic 
categories on two out of three factors (with 
scoring in the top half of Gene–Environment 
Interactionism counting in the genetic cat-
egory). Disciplines in the environmental- 
emphasis group include anthropology, drama, 
education, ethnic studies, history, history and 
philosophy of science, literary study, music, reli-
gious studies, sociology, visual arts, and women’s 
or gender studies (N = 264). Disciplines in the 
genetic-emphasis group include criminology, 
communication, economics, empirical study 
of arts, evolutionary humanities, evolutionary 
social sciences, film studies, philosophy, polit-
ical science, and psychology (N = 351).
FIGURE 6 Factor Scores for Disciplines Emphasizing Genes or Environment.
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The polarization of causal scores correlates 
with the polarization of scores on Scientific 
Explanation. Ten of the twelve disciplines in 
the environmental-emphasis group score in the 
bottom half of the distribution on Scientific 
Explanation. Nine out of ten of the disciplines in 
the genetic-emphasis group score in the top half 
of the distribution on Scientific Explanation.
DISCUSSION
Genes, Environments, and Culture: What People 
Believe
Three central themes are embedded in the 
survey: (1) beliefs about the relationship 
between genes and environments, (2) beliefs 
about the specific character of culture as a fea-
ture of the environment, and (3) beliefs about 
scientific explanation. We shall first examine 
beliefs about relationships among genes, envi-
ronments, and culture, then the correlation 
between causal beliefs and beliefs about the 
validity and scope of scientific explanation.
Statements on beliefs about culture are cru-
cially important because scholars and scientists 
who emphasize “environment” are in most cases 
thinking much less of the physical environment 
than of the social and cultural environment. 
“Environment” is the more encompassing term, 
but “culture” or “society” is the term that most 
scholars emphasize when designating causes of 
behavior, gender identity, values, beliefs, and 
feelings. That kind of emphasis is evident in 
many of the comments offered by respondents, 
for example:
In my view, “environmental conditions” don’t 
simply include “cultural conventions”; they’re 
inevitably shaped by and understood through the 
lens of cultural conventions and have virtually no 
existence apart from these. (literary study)
I have a hard time responding to these ques-
tions because I believe that humans can have 
a “nature”—in the sense of certain patterns 
of behavior that are reproduced across cul-
tural contexts—without that necessarily being 
genetically transmitted or programmed. It’s 
rather classically sociological, I suppose, to 
think that the problem of social life creates 
some universal human characteristics, that are 
derived more from the institutional structures 
we are born into than the genetic material 
we are born with. (sociology)
“Gender identity” is itself a cultural term and 
concept, whose content has changed in recent 
years. (history)
Not being what is called an “essentialist,” 
I’m inclined to say that human beings have 
a history rather than a “nature,” and that what 
counts as being human is contingent upon 
many variable conditions, so that the “man–
animal” relationship is open and subject to 
local social, cultural, and historical qualifica-
tion. (literary study)
Such comments need to be taken into account 
when registering what respondents mean in 
producing scores that are incorporated in the 
factor Environmental Determinism.
Designating either group in figure 6 as 
“ determinist”—environmental or genetic—would 
evidently be a mistake. On Environmental 
Determinism, the group emphasizing envi-
ronmental causes scores below 4.0—the score 
stipulating “neither agree nor disagree.” On 
Genetic Determinism, the group emphasiz-
ing genetic causes scores between the neutral 
4.0 position and 5.0, which is the lowest level of 
affirmative agreement. On Gene–Environment 
Interactionism, the genetic-emphasis group scores 
higher than the environmental- emphasis group, 
thus moderating their emphasis on genetic causes. 
Both groups score well into the affirmative range 
on Gene–Environment Interactionism.
Do the two groups then basically agree on 
the range of causal factors, differing only in their 
emphasis on one or the other of the causal fac-
tors? Many of the written comments do suggest 
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a difference of emphasis, but sometimes the 
 difference in degree amounts to a qualitative 
 difference; strong causal primacy is accorded either 
to genes or environments, especially cultural envi-
ronments. Here below is a sampling of statements 
on genetic and environmental primacy.
I think that human behavior is determined, not 
exclusively, but predominantly by environmental 
conditions, including cultural conventions. (his-
tory and philosophy of science)
I believe gender identity reflects a mixture of 
genetic and cultural inputs, with the genetic 
being somewhat more important. (evolution-
ary social sciences)
Even if there may be cases in which genetics 
has influence on gender identity, I think that 
this case is the exception. (history and philos-
ophy of science)
All characteristics are produced by interactions 
between genes and “environmental” condi-
tions if we define “environmental” broadly to 
include other genes (i.e., the environment of 
one gene is other genes). But, it’s highly doubt-
ful that cultural conventions influence gender 
identity too strongly. If cultural conventions 
influenced gender identities, and were gender 
identity merely an arbitrary social construc-
tion, humans wouldn’t be here anymore. The 
genes hold culture on a leash to some degree. 
(evolutionary social sciences)
The extent to which a gender identity is outward-
ly expressed is mediated by one’s environmental 
acceptance of fluctuating gender identities, but 
the underlying gender self-identity is almost 
exclusively biologically based. (Thus, my view 
of an interaction.) (evolutionary social sciences)
The interaction is the only possible real answer, 
but statistically it is clear that biological 
characteristics are the more important factor in 
it. (evolutionary social sciences)
Clearly there is some sort of interaction. 
Which predominates? I tend to give the nod to 
environmental factors. (history)
Interaction—but “genes” are more important. 
(political science)
I agree that biological characteristics play a role 
in gender-identity formation, but I suppose 
I absolutely disagree that they do so “predomi-
nantly.” (literary studies)
While the third statement, human behavior 
being produced by an interaction, appears 
more compelling to me, the role of genetically 
transmitted characteristics are likely to be more 
decisive. (political science)
Differences of emphasis allow for alternative 
hypotheses to be tested empirically. But confir-
mation or falsification of competing hypotheses 
requires that the formulators of the hypotheses 
agree on the meaning of terms. What precisely is 
“culture”; what is its origin? And how indepen-
dent is it as a causal agent? The comments suggest 
conflicting answers to these questions. Comments 
from disciplines giving emphasis to genetic causes 
identify culture as essentially constrained and 
channeled by genes. Comments from disciplines 
giving emphasis to environmental causes suggest 
that culture operates in largely autonomous ways, 
overwhelming biological constraints. In one form, 
this belief implies a kind of dualism in which cer-
tain aspects of life are controlled by biology, while 
other aspects are purely cultural. A version of this 
culturalist dualism posits a sharp break between 
biology and culture: biology is a physical fact but 
has no influence on identity, values, or beliefs. 
Here below is a sampling of statements reflecting 
these different ideas about what culture is and how 
it operates as a causal force.
Culture originates in biology and is 
Channeled by it
Biological and social experiences do shape 
parts of the life cycle (like speed of growth, 
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timing of reproductive maturity), but the cycle 
itself exists through natural selection, and 
many of the experience-moderators are them-
selves adaptations. (political science)
Surely the predominance of pentatonic music 
in various cultures (e.g.) has quite a lot to do 
with the way that the human brain processes 
sound, which is a result of various evolutionary 
forces pre-dating culture. (philosophy)
Clearly things like reproductive maturity, 
taboos, growth rates, religions, etc. are all a prod-
uct of our evolved genetic abilities and fairly free 
to vary as a function of the cultural institutions 
and norms that develop in path-dependent ways 
and in response to different ecological settings. 
Part of human nature is to be a cultural species. 
(evolutionary social science)
Many genetically transmitted traits are likely 
shaped by cultural conventions (that is, culture 
can exert selection pressures on genes), and as 
recent work in epigenetics is starting to show, 
the same genes often express themselves differ-
ently depending on different environmental 
triggers. And conversely, cultural conventions 
don’t come out of thin air; our capacities to 
be attuned to culture are rooted in genetically 
evolved cultural learning. (psychology)
Culture is autonomous or primary
I would prefer to say that “genes and culture 
have had cumulative causal effects on each 
other, with genetic changes leading to cultural 
developments, and with cultural developments 
leading to genetic changes” in pre-historic times, 
until the emergence of Homo sapiens; and that 
“culture has evolved independently of human 
biological evolution” ever since. (anthropology)
While there is a biological human nature, 
shaped by evolution, one of its components is 
high intelligence (with a few, prominent, excep-
tions), allowing for a high degree of behavioural 
flexibility. Hence, human cultures are extremely 
diverse and complex, making it all but impos-
sible to discern how much of our behaviour is 
“natural.” (history and philosophy of science)
The problem I see in these questions is that 
they take as an epistemological starting point 
an ontological divide between nature and cul-
ture. Yet I believe that this divide itself is a 
cultural product. (anthropology)
some aspeCts of Culture are Constrained 
by biology, and some are not
Important aspects of human “nature” are 
genetically transmitted, but given that an 
essential part of our human nature is to par-
ticipate in symbolic culture, that is a matter of 
shared agreements—which are not genetically 
determined. (anthropology)
Values I take to be cultural. Beliefs? Well, what 
do you have in mind? My belief that some-
thing is colored certainly has a genetic/biologi-
cal component; I “come equipped” to perceive 
some colors and sounds, for example. But 
my beliefs about kinship systems? Don’t see a 
genetic component creating those beliefs. Not 
sure what is meant by “feelings.” Perhaps there 
is a natural aversion to certain things, e.g., spi-
ders. But feeling patriotic? Again, I see a larger 
cultural component to most of these matters, 
but my weight would shift depending on topic 
under discussion. (history)
meaning is Cultural and is independent 
of biologiCal faCt
The human species-typical set of characteris-
tics is a set of biological characteristics, which 
do not determine cultural characteristics. 
All the stages of the human life cycle (even 
birth and death), although with a biological 
substratum, are endowed with different mean-
ings in different cultures. (history and philos-
ophy of science)
Human capacities to acquire patterns of 
thought and behavior are inherited, but this 
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does not mean that there is an “underlying 
unity” other than this innate plasticity. Even 
aspects of the life cycle, though regulated by 
inherited traits, is flexible. More importantly, 
“life” and “cycle” are themselves subjectively 
apprehended, and so even if people’s biologi-
cal life went through a fixed series of stages or 
processes, its formation as a “life” depends on 
how that individual’s mind sees itself and has 
learned to see itself. (anthropology)
Maybe it is true that hormones strongly govern 
whether someone feels to be a man or woman. 
But then again, what it means to be a man, i.e., 
the gender identity, is a purely cultural ques-
tion. (sociology)
Human (Darwinian) evolution/origin of species 
remains a theory, embedded in categories then 
words of human invention. No historian, of any 
segment of humanity, could ever agree that any 
such universal is absolutely true. (history)
The tendency to regard culture as an autonomous 
or semiautonomous force can be contrasted with 
an extreme biologism that denies the existence 
of culture altogether. The comments (number-
ing about 500 total) contained one such state-
ment: “I don’t know what culture is. I see animal 
behavior as an effect of genes interacting with 
environments. I see human behavior the same 
way. I don’t find it necessary to invoke ‘culture’ 
in either case” (evolutionary social science). The 
opposite extreme appears in comments already 
quoted—statements such as “environmental 
conditions” have “virtually no existence” outside 
of “‘cultural conventions,’” and that “the prob-
lem of social life creates some universal human 
characteristics, that are derived more from the 
institutional structures we are born into than the 
genetic material we are born with.”
Four Statements about Culture
The survey questionnaire contains four state-
ments about culture. These four statements 
are dispersed in the factor analysis; they are 
associated with three separate factors. Two 
statements are included in the Environmental 
Determinism factor: “Culture is not constrained 
by genetically transmitted human behavioral 
dispositions”; and “Culture evolves inde-
pendently of human biological evolution.” One 
statement is included in Genetic Determinism: 
“Culture is produced by genetically transmitted 
human behavioral dispositions interacting with 
environmental conditions.” The remaining 
statement is included in Gene–Environment 
Interactionism: “During human evolution, 
genes and culture have had cumulative causal 
effects on each other, with genetic changes lead-
ing to cultural developments, and with cultural 
developments leading to genetic changes.” 
The idea that culture operates independently 
of biology appears to influence the score on one 
of the cultural statements in the questionnaire: 
“Culture is produced by genetically transmitted 
human behavioral dispositions interacting with 
environmental conditions” (see figure 7; in the 
graph, the phrasing in all four cultural ques-
tions has been condensed for reasons of space).
The group emphasizing environmental 
causes scores 3.51 in response to that first cul-
tural statement in figure 7—below the point 
(4.0) of neither agreeing nor disagreeing. 
In other words, the group on average disagrees 
with the statement that culture is produced by 
the interaction of genes and environmental 
conditions. From a biological perspective, one 
might ask: If culture is not produced by an 
interaction of genes and environmental condi-
tions, from what could it possibly be produced? 
What feature of any aspect of the biological 
world is not ultimately a product of the inter-
action of genes and environments? The answer 
“nothing” is implied in three comments:
I don’t even know what the final statement 
[culture evolves independently of biology] 
could mean. “Culture” is biological; non-living 
things don’t have culture. (evolutionary social 
sciences)
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FIGURE 7 Scores on Culture Questions for Disciplines Emphasizing Genes or Environment.
Cultural dynamics can be independent for 
a very long time but will then at some point 
tie up with biological evolution. (evolutionary 
social sciences)
Over more recent, and shorter time intervals 
culture can evolve somewhat independently of 
biology, but over the span of human evolution, 
the past 7 million years, clearly culture has 
not been independent of biological evolution. 
(evolutionary social sciences)
Both the environmental-emphasis and genet-
ic-emphasis groups score in the affirmative range 
on the factor Gene–Environment Interactionism, 
but on the first culture question—the question 
about the source of culture itself—the environ-
mental-emphasis group is particularly reluctant 
to acknowledge that this interaction produces 
culture. The implication is that culture is tran-
scendent and autonomous; it is not a product of 
biological processes. 
For those who look for hopeful signs of 
potential consensus about the relations between 
nature and nurture, biology and culture, some 
reassurance can perhaps be derived by the scores 
on the other three cultural questions. Both 
groups score in the affirmative range on the 
statement that culture and genes have coevolved. 
On the statement that culture is not constrained 
by genes, neither group scores in the affirmative 
range; that is, neither group denies that culture 
is constrained by genes. On the statement that 
culture evolves independently of biology, again, 
neither group scores in the affirmative range. 
All three points of agreement have to be 
qualified. As one of the comments quoted 
above indicates, researchers can acknowledge 
that genes and culture coevolved in prehistoric 
times but nonetheless maintain that for modern 
Homo sapiens culture has become detached 
from biology. The idea that genes constrain 
culture seems hard to reconcile with the idea 
that culture is not produced by interactions 
between genes and environmental conditions. 
Likewise, the idea that culture does not evolve 
independently of biology seems hard to recon-
cile with the idea that culture is not produced 
by interactions between genes and environ-
mental conditions. (Consider the propositions 
with a change of sign from negative to posi-
tive: “Culture is produced by an interaction 
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between genes and environmental conditions, 
but culture evolves independently of biology.”) 
And finally, there are substantial differences of 
degree in the scores of these two groups on all 
four statements about culture.
Scientific Explanation and Beliefs about  
Biology and Culture
The two polarized groups—genetic-emphasis 
and environmental-emphasis—contrast sharply 
on the Scientific Explanation Factor score. 
The group emphasizing environmental causes 
scores 3.54, below the affirmative range. The 
group emphasizing genetic causes scores 5.28, 
inside the affirmative range. That contrast cor-
responds to the negative correlation between 
Scientific Explanation and Environmental 
Determinism (r = -.40, p < .001) and to the pos-
itive correlation between Scientific Explanation 
and Genetic Determinism (r = .54, p < .001).
How are we to interpret the correlation 
between believing in genetic influences and 
believing in scientific explanation? One pos-
sible interpretation is that scientific evidence 
gives strong grounds for a rational belief in the 
biological underpinnings of human behavior 
and human experience. Conversely, an unwill-
ingness to acknowledge the biological under-
pinnings of human behavior could motivate 
skepticism about science in general. These 
complementary hypotheses both posit a causal 
relation between belief in genetic causes and 
belief in science. It is, of course, also possible 
that some trait of intellectual character, or some 
more general belief system, underlies and causes 
both a belief or disbelief in genetic influences 
and a belief or disbelief in scientific evidence. 
Traits of intellectual character that might 
influence both beliefs about science and beliefs 
about genetic and environmental/cultural 
influences include personality factors like those 
explored by psychologists who investigate the 
relations between temperament and beliefs 
(Eysenck and Wilson 1978; Paulhus and John 
1998; Paulhus and Trapnell 2008; Graham, 
Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Hirsh et al. 2010; 
Dodd et al. 2012; Haidt 2012; Oakley 2014; 
Ståhl, Zaal, and Skitka 2016). Much of the 
research exploring correlations between per-
sonality and belief systems focuses on polit-
ical and ideological beliefs. Those issues seem 
particularly relevant to diverging beliefs about 
environmental and genetic causes of human 
behavior. Accusations of “biological determin-
ism” have typically been accompanied by claims 
that belief in genetic causes undermines the 
hope of altering human behavior in ways con-
cordant with liberal or progressive social ideals. 
Or more aggressively, that belief in genetic 
causes provides a biologically grounded sanc-
tion for violence and for existing distributions of 
social power (Sociobiology Study Group 1976; 
Lewontin 1980; Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin 
1984; Degler 1991; Buss and Malamuth 1996; 
Segerstråle 2000; Pinker 2002; Vandermassen 
2005; Tybur, Miller, and Gangestad 2007; 
Duarte et al. 2015). A model of personality that 
incorporates a conception of “honesty” (the “H 
Factor”) might help integrate hypotheses about 
underlying qualities of intellectual character 
with hypotheses of direct causal relationships 
between belief in science and belief in genetic 
influences (Chirumbolo and Leone 2010; 
Lee and Ashton 2012; Rindermann, Flores-
Mendoza, and Woodley 2012; de Vries et al. 
2016).
Among candidates for more general belief 
systems that could influence the correlation 
between Scientific Explanation and the causal 
factors, one belief system emerges most promi-
nently: the ontological and epistemological dual-
ism suggested by many of the comments written 
into the questionnaire and also by disagreement 
with the proposition that culture is produced by 
interactions among genes and environmental 
conditions. Here below is a sampling of com-
ments suggesting how a dualistic world view 
manifests itself in attitudes toward science.
Human behavior is not subject to immutable 
laws, and, therefore, can’t be studied scientifically. 
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The “social sciences” in my view, relate closer to 
philosophy than to the hard sciences, although 
some biological and psychological factors can 
be studied scientifically. Some subjective human 
experience could possibly be explained scientifi-
cally. (religious studies)
I certainly think that many aspects of nature 
and some aspects of human behavior, experi-
ence, and the creative arts can be explained by 
science. But I see scientific explanations as typ-
ically limited both by a failure to admit their 
own subjective biases, their own partiality, and 
by their emphasis on quantitative data to the 
exclusion of messy, unstable aspects irreducible 
to numbers. (literary studies)
Scientific knowledge has something to tell us 
about material artifacts and their production, 
but “human nature,” “human experience,” and 
“human behavior” are not empirically stable. 
(literary studies)
It would be important here to distinguish 
between “natural sciences” and “human sci-
ences.” My agreement with these statements 
depends on the understanding that “human 
nature” (behavior, subjective experience, art, 
etc.) cannot be explained by hard, natural sci-
ences, but only by interpretive, symbolic, his-
torical sciences. (anthropology)
Perhaps good to mention that I am a Christian: 
I have my doubts about the truth of macro 
evolutionism, and strongly oppose all kinds of 
determinism, perhaps with divine predestina-
tion as the only exception. I believe humans 
are composed of a soul and a body, ergo the 
impossibility of scientific understanding of 
humans in all their facets. I notice these con-
victions, for which I believe to have good argu-
ments, playing a role in answering this survey. 
(religious studies)
“Culture” isn’t a thing—you can’t trace ori-
gins or really ever hope to accurately describe 
“key characteristics” of a given cultural form 
(and what is that anyway—do you mean cul-
tural group, organisational culture, what is 
 “culture”??). Human societies are constantly 
shifting and changing, and figuring out how 
those changes happen and why they take the 
direction they do is a pretty fruitless enter-
prise. Surely biology and cultural norms are 
interrelated, but I don’t think any of your 
statements above can adequately capture 
what that relationship might be, and it’s really 
problematic to try to attribute some sort of 
originating force to one or the other. (wom-
en’s or gender studies)
From a dualist perspective, it might be pos-
sible for the physical world to be known by 
science, reduced to quantitative terms, but 
the human world is qualitative, irreducible, 
knowable only phenomenally, subjectively, 
in ways that cannot be either falsified or 
confirmed by scientific criteria of epistemic 
validity. 
Most of the comments affirming a belief in 
science were similar to one another—making a 
distinction between what is now known (lim-
ited) and what hypothetically can be known 
(much less limited).
I think none of these things is likely to ever be 
completely known, but it’s just due to limita-
tions in our imagination and time, and not due 
to in-principle barriers to any of these things 
(except possibly for results related to incom-
pleteness theorems, uncertainty principles, and 
the like). (philosophy)
I had trouble answering these because I didn’t 
know if you mean can be explained with 
the current theories or if you meant can be 
explained in principle (that is, will eventually 
be explained by scientific theories). (evolution-
ary social sciences)
In theory I agree with all of these statements. 
In practice, I’m not sure it could ever happen. 
(evolutionary social sciences)
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Subjective experience—not yet for sure, but 
maybe in the future. (evolutionary social 
sciences)
 We’re a long way from it, but I believe it’s 
possible! (evolutionary social sciences)
CONCLUSION
Are the social sciences and humanities moving 
toward consensus about the biological under-
pinnings of human behavior and cultural expe-
rience? If all the disciplines discussing these 
questions agreed on the validity of scientific 
evidence, some eventual consensus would seem 
more likely. The low regard in which science is 
held by disciplines that emphasize environmen-
tal causes suggests that there are no common 
criteria of epistemic validity by means of which 
the two groups—those who emphasize genetic 
causes and those who emphasize environmental 
causes, and especially cultural causes—could 
work toward a reasoned consensus. 
The common willingness to affirm that 
behavior and experience are produced by inter-
actions between genes and environments offers 
some prospect for reasoned debate. Even so, 
ambiguities and confusions over what is meant 
by that interaction—what culture is, where 
it originates, and how independent it is—are 
likely to impede rational agreement, and even 
rational disagreement, on some of the questions 
that most urgently concern social scientists and 
humanists: the causes of human behavior, the 
causes of variations in behavior, the sources of 
personal identity, and the sources of values, 
beliefs, and feelings. The degree to which  science 
can illuminate these questions is itself an issue of 
central concern in both the social sciences and 
the humanities. The failure to reach agreement 
on that one question is the chief obstacle imped-
ing rational debate on all the other questions. 
Insofar as affirmative scores on Gene–
Culture Interactionism provide a basis for 
rational debate and the testing of alterna-
tive hypotheses, the question posed by the 
 divergences of causal belief can be reduced to 
this: To what extent do genes constrain human 
behavior, identity, values, beliefs, and feelings? 
Or conversely, to what extent are environmental 
influences, and especially culture, free to shape 
human behavior, identity, values, beliefs, and 
feelings independently of genetically transmit-
ted dispositions and capacities? Knowledge on 
these issues can be produced both by research 
on particular topics, such as child development, 
mating, parenting, and social behavior (Dunbar 
and Barrett 2007; Gangestad and Simpson 
2007; Buss 2016), and by research on gene–
culture coevolution and the cognitive founda-
tions of cultural learning (Lumsden and Wilson 
1981; Baumeister 2005; Richerson and Boyd 
2005; Cochran and Harpending 2009; Henrich 
2016). Arguments that cultural meanings are 
independent of biological facts can be tested 
by cross-cultural comparisons that identify 
underlying commonalities in conceptions of 
life phases, family and kinship, social relation-
ships, and forms of imaginative culture, such as 
religions, ideologies, and the arts (Brown 1991; 
Dissanayake 2000; Norenzayan and Heine 
2005; Carroll 2012; Antweiler 2016). Research 
in cognitive and affective neuroscience can 
test claims for phenomenal experiential diver-
sity (Panksepp 1998; Cacioppo and Patrick 
2008; Chiao 2011; Decety and Cacioppo 
2011; Panksepp and Biven 2012). Is it true 
that all cultures experience hunger, curiosity, 
sexual ardor, maternal affection, or loneliness 
in radically different ways? Are there in fact no 
common biological sources for kinship systems 
or patriotism? These are empirical questions.
Particular empirical findings, if they are suf-
ficiently robust—supported by converging lines 
of evidence—have a special status as “facts” 
against which hypotheses and theories can be 
tested. A converse but complementary kind of 
epistemic strength arises from the integration 
of individual facts within a larger network of 
explanatory principles. For the evolutionary 
social sciences and evolutionary humanities, 
facts can be integrated within at least four main 
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networks. The most comprehensive network, 
containing the other three, is the whole system 
of evolutionary biology, founded on Darwin’s 
theory of evolution by means of natural selec-
tion but extended and supported in the Modern 
Synthesis: the integration of Darwin’s theory 
with post-Mendelian genetics. Explanatory 
networks that are specific to humans, and thus 
to the social sciences and humanities, include 
human life history theory, gene–culture coevo-
lution, and biocultural theory. 
Human life history theory, a subset of life 
history theory in general biology, organizes 
basic motives and kinds of human relation-
ships in a species-typical configuration, extend-
ing over the main phases of life. Research on 
human life history analyzes the interdependent 
causal functions of anatomical and neurological 
development, modes of provisioning, reproduc-
tion, sexual division of labor, family, kinship, 
and social interaction (Kaplan and Gangestad 
2005; Wade 2006; Hill, Barton, and Hurtado 
2009; Kaplan, Gurven, and Winking 2009; 
Hill et al. 2011; Muehlenbein and Flinn 2011; 
Wade 2014). 
Gene–culture coevolution delineates the 
sequence of causal interactions, over evo-
lutionary time scales, between physical 
evolution—anatomical, physiological, and neu-
rological—and cultural practices. Many evolu-
tionary social scientists now recognize that the 
human species has uniquely developed capac-
ities for acquiring cultural learning, and that 
those capacities have, over millions of years, 
profoundly altered the human genome, shaping 
the body and brain and generating the potential 
for complex technology and social interaction 
(Lumsden and Wilson 1981, 1983; Boyd and 
Richerson 2007; Cochran and Harpending 
2009; Carroll 2011; Henrich 2016). 
Biocultural theory assimilates the concepts 
in evolutionary biology, human life history 
theory, and gene–culture coevolution, and 
brings them to bear on the interactions between 
culture and biologically grounded motives and 
passions in specific historical cultures (Turchin 
2006; Smail 2008; Fukuyama 2011; Clasen 
2012; Fukuyama 2014; Carroll et al. 2015; 
Turchin 2015). Biocultural theory offers the 
most obvious and direct opportunities for inte-
grating cultural insights from the humanities 
within the explanatory networks made available 
in evolutionary social science. 
Researchers who declare that human 
behavior cannot be studied scientifically 
can perhaps never be reached by appeals 
based on evidence gathered in research like 
that pursued by scientists and scholars who 
affirm a biological basis for human behav-
ior. But then, there is no epistemic method 
or body of beliefs on which humanity as a 
whole has ever reached complete consensus. 
All over the world, large numbers of people 
believe in various forms of supernatural-
ism, both religious and merely superstitious. 
In the United States, creationists occupy con-
siderable space in public discourse. Among 
the comments in the survey, a few express 
overtly religious skepticism about the prem-
ises of the survey. For instance, “Man is 
a spiritual being. Material factors depend 
on our beliefs; they can be changed by our 
spiritual development. I believe in spiritual 
factors as playing a great role in the devel-
opment of individual beings as well as cul-
tures. I don’t believe in the genetic evolution 
of species. There is an imprint of divinity in 
each person that ensures our commonalities” 
(ethnic studies).
Most researchers who regard human behav-
ior as beyond the reach of science, or who deny 
that science has any special claims on the pro-
duction of knowledge, have more academic 
respectability than creationists, but they are 
similar to creationists in that they step willingly 
outside the circle of knowledge susceptible 
to empirical falsification. Are the culturalists 
and bioculturalists then at an impasse, unable 
to find shared epistemic ground? The status 
quo, in intellectual as in political history, is 
never really stable, certainly not permanent. 
The statistical snapshot taken in this survey 
This content downloaded from 
            206.208.133.34 on Tue, 15 Sep 2020 21:46:17 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
A Cross-Disciplinary Survey of Beliefs about Human Nature, Culture, and Science
ESIC | Vol. 1 | No. 1 | Spring 2017 29
is a moment in time, a cross section from a 
landscape constantly changing, and now tend-
ing unmistakably toward an integrated biocul-
tural understanding of human behavior. The 
further biocultural research goes in producing 
knowledge about particular cultures—opening 
deeper levels of inquiry, and revealing deeper 
networks of causal explanation—the less fea-
sible it will seem for any serious academic 
discipline to claim exemption from criteria of 
empirical validity, and the less attraction any 
such claim will exercise. 
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